Who Wants to Work in a Rural Health Post? The Role of Intrinsic Motivation, Rural Background and Faith-Based Institutions in Rwanda and Ethiopia by Pieter Serneels et al.
Who Wants to Work in a Rural Health Post?   
The Role of Intrinsic Motivation, Rural Background and Faith-
Based Institutions in Rwanda and Ethiopia 
Pieter Serneels






5, and Aklilu Kidanu
6. 
1. University of East Anglia, UK 
2. Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain 
3. University of Sussex, Brighton, UK and The World Bank, USA 
4. Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, UK 
5. Abt Associates, Rwanda 
6. Miz-Hasab Research Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
*Corresponding author: Gunilla Pettersson, the World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, 
Washington, DC 20433, USA. E-mail: gpettersson@worldbank.org 
This study was funded by the World Bank. Montalvo acknowledges the support of 
SEJ2007-64340 and ICREA-Academia. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not 
necessarily represent the views of the World Bank. We would like to thank Agnes 
Soucat, Magnus Lindelöw, and Chris Herbst for their continuous support and for 
sharing their refelctions. 
CSAE WPS/2010-102 
Abstract 
Background: Most developing countries face shortages of health workers in rural 
areas. This has profound consequences for health service delivery, and ultimately for 
health outcomes. To design policies that rectify these geographic imbalances it is 
vital to understand what factors determine health workers’ choice to work in rural 
areas. But empirical analysis of health worker preferences has remained limited due 
to the lack of data. 
Methods:  Using unique contingent valuation data from a cohort survey of 412 
nursing and medical students in Rwanda, this paper examines the determinants of 
future health workers’ willingness to work in rural areas, as measured by rural 
reservation wages, using regression analysis. These data are also combined with 
those from an identical survey in Ethiopia to enable a two-country analysis.
Results:  Health workers with higher intrinsic motivation – measured as the 
importance attached to helping the poor – as well as those who have grown up in a 
rural area, and Adventists who participate in a local bonding scheme are all 
significantly more willing to work in a rural area. The main Rwanda result for 
intrinsic motivation is strikingly similar to that obtained for Ethiopia and Rwanda 
together. 
Discussion:  The results suggest that in addition to economic incentives, intrinsic 
motivation and rural origin play an important role in health workers’ decisions to 
work in a rural area, and that faith-based institutions matter. 3 
1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that health workers form the foundation of health service 
delivery: their numbers, skill, and commitment are critical for the delivery of good 
quality health care. Renewed attention is being given to the role of geographical 
imbalances in the health workforce, a feature of nearly all health systems, which 
raises concerns about equity – in access to health care – and efficiency – whether 
resources are allocated where they have the biggest impact on health outcomes. The 
issue is particularly relevant for developing countries with limited resources and poor 
health outcomes. 
Ultimately, the difficulties to attract and retain staff in rural facilities stem from the 
preferences that health workers have and the choices they make. A growing body of 
evidence shows that, apart from wages, other job attributes like training 
opportunities, career development prospects, and living and working conditions also 
play a role [1]. However, little attention has been given to the supply side, namely to 
differences in preferences among health workers, which is of interest to 
policymakers exploring how to address these imbalances. Policies have shifted from 
compulsory rural service, which is challenging to manage and enforce, to providing 
extra economic incentives for rural service, such as rural allowances and bonuses [2]. 
But there is, in the absence of rigorous evaluation, limited understanding of how 
effective these incentives are in attracting and retaining health workers in rural areas. 
The available evidence suggests that while they can improve short term recruitment, 
their success for long term retention is less clear [3]. To address these difficulties, 
countries as diverse as the US, Australia, Thailand, and Indonesia have attempted 4 
recruitment programs that target health workers who are more committed to rural 
service [4]. Emerging survey evidence suggests that health workers with a rural 
background are more willing to work there, and more responsive to additional 
incentives to work in rural areas [5]. Recent theoretical work also suggests that 
intrinsic motivation, the tendency to do something for its own sake, can have a 
strong effect on job choice, and new evidence confirms this for health workers in 
developing countries [6]. However, most human resource policies do not take into 
account heterogeneity in health worker preferences. This paper examines more 
closely to what extent health workers differ in their willingness to work in rural 
areas, and the reasons for these differences.  
Using unique data obtained based on contingent valuation questions, we find that 
intrinsic motivation, rural background, and Adventists’ participation in a local 
bonding scheme, are strongly positively related with willingness to work in a rural 
area in Rwanda. These results, especially those related to intrinsic motivation, are 
highly consistent with those obtained from joint analysis with data from an identical 
survey in Ethiopia, providing new evidence that intrinsic motivation plays a key role 
for health workers’ job choice. 
The next section provides the background to the health sector in Rwanda and 
Ethiopia; Section 3 explains the analytical methods, while Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results. 5 
2. Context and Data 
Rwanda has in the last decade allocated significant financial resources to the health 
sector. Nevertheless, key indicators of service utilization and health outcomes remain 
well below the Sub-Sahara African average [7],[8]. Policymakers in Rwanda agree 
that human resources are the main constraint to improving health care, with both 
overall shortages and geographic imbalances being main factors. With almost 88 
percent of doctors and 58 percent of nurses working in urban areas, while 82 percent 
of the population reside in rural areas, the distribution of health workers is highly 
skewed in favor of urban areas [9],[10].  
The data we use come from a cohort survey conducted in 2008 by the authors, which 
surveyed 288 nurses and 124 medical students. Using a two stage sampling strategy 
to first select the schools, stratified by type of ownership, and then select the 
students, the survey is broadly representative and the samples of medical and nursing 
students represent 53 and 77 percent of their respective cohorts. While the final year 
medical students come from the only medical school in Rwanda, the second and 
third year nursing students come from two government schools and one NGO school.  
The survey uses a self-administered (supervised) questionnaire and a medical 
knowledge test and contains questions on job choice, economic welfare, and 
demographic characteristics; it also attempts to measure health worker motivation, as 
discussed below. 
Since the government plays an important role both in the assignment of public sector 
health workers and in the determination of their wages, which therefore show limited 
variation, actual salaries do not reflect personal valuations. We therefore use 6 
contingent valuation to assess respondent’s willingness to work in rural areas [11]. 
Its use in the field of human resources for health is rare, and we know of only two 
examples: a study in Indonesia, which found that doctors under certain 
circumstances can be attracted to more remote areas using relatively small cash 
incentives, and the Ethiopia study discussed elsewhere in this paper [5],[12]. 
The contingent valuation method is used to elicit the valuation of goods or services 
for which there is no market. An example is the protection of a national park, where 
the value of preserving the park is elicited through contingent valuation questions for 
different groups of people to inform a cost-benefit analysis of policies to protect it. 
Thus, contingent valuation provides a method for gauging the otherwise unobserved 
demand curve. In this paper we use contingent valuation questions because the 
individuals in our sample have not yet entered the labor market, and there is 
therefore no observable wage. Furthermore, even after these students have entered 
the labour market, we only observe either the urban or the rural wage, not both and 
contingent valuation thus also provides a future counterfactual. 
There has been controversy over how contingent valuations should be conducted 
[11],[13]. We followed best practice by administering the questionnaires in the 
schools, supervised by team members, to students whom have had practical work 
experience; by using actual starting wages for nurses and doctors as the reference 
wages; by offering a concrete choice between a post in Kigali and a post 100km from 
Kigali; and by using a payment card type question providing respondents with a 
range of well-defined offers [11].7 
We use a question similar to that used in Ethiopia, but adapted to Rwanda after 
careful piloting; it was phrased as follows:  
“Imagine that when you finish your studies you are offered two jobs as a 
health worker in the public sector, one in Kigali and one in a rural area 
100km from Kigali. Both contracts are for at least 3 years and the jobs are 
otherwise identical. Your monthly salary for the job in Kigali would be 
215,000 Rwandese Francs. Which job would you choose if your monthly 
salary for the rural job would be $ amount” 
The question is repeated for seven different salary levels $, starting at 165,000 RWF 
and gradually increasing up to 515,000 RWF for nursing students, and beginning at 
310,000 RWF up to 710,000 RWF for medical students. For students with a 
reservation wage greater than the highest offer, an open-ended question was added to 
limit censoring from above. 
Figure 1 plots the histograms of rural reservation wages (expressed in 2008 PPP 
US$) and indicates that while the distribution for nurses tends to be bimodal, with 
one group of nurses having relatively low reservation wages and a second group 
distributed around a higher mean; the distribution for medical students is unimodal 
[14]. Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution functions (CDF). The line to the left 
reflects the CDF for nurses and indicates that close to 40 percent of nursing students 
are willing to work in a rural area at the current starting wage (875 US$ PPP), and 
that more nursing students are willing to work in a rural post as wage offers increase. 
A crude reading of the CDF suggests that to get 80 percent of new nurses to take up 
a rural post (under the strong assumption that wages are the sole determinant of 
location decisions) would require an average premium of 71 percent on top of the 
current starting wage. For medical students, only 7 percent are willing to work in a 
rural area for the current wage (1,430 US$ PPP), and the concave shape of the CDF 8 
indicates that at higher wage levels, additional wage increases attract fewer extra 
doctors to rural areas. To get 80 percent of doctors taking up a rural post would 
require a wage premium of 57 percent. Qualitative research and the scarce existing 
quantitative research suggest that these differences in reservation wages are driven 
by a range of health worker characteristics, including motivation, rural background 
and household income [5],[12]. 
3. Estimation method  
To analyze the contingent valuation data we estimate the following equation for the 
Rwanda sample: 
RWi = 0 + 1HELPOORi + 2HHEXPi+3TSCOREi + 4FEMALEi +5AGEi+6DISTANCEi 
+ 7KIGALIi + 8RELIGIOUSAFFILi + 9DOCTORi + 10STUDYYRi +11OPENVALi + i 
The dependent variable RW is the natural log of the reservation wage at which a rural 
post is accepted. On the right-hand-side HELPPOOR is our measure for intrinsic 
motivation, and equals one if ‘opportunity to help the poor’ is ranked as the most 
important job characteristic by the respondent relative to other job attributes related 
to extrinsic motivation. The variable HHEXP reflects the welfare of the parental 
household since most students do not have their own household yet. Having included 
questions on asset ownership identical to the ones used in the national Integrated 
Household Living Conditions Survey (IHLCS) conducted by the National Institute of 
Statistics of Rwanda, we can predict household expenditures [15]. The medical 
knowledge test score, TSCORE, allows us to test the presumption that students who 
perform better in school are less likely to work in rural areas. Further variables 9 
included on the right-hand-side are FEMALE and AGE. We also include variables 
reflecting rural or urban background: DISTANCE, the time it took to walk to school 
at age six, and KIGALI, which equals one if the respondent was born in Kigali. In 
line with previous findings we expect health workers from rural areas to be more 
willing to work in a rural setting. A variable reflecting religious affiliation, 
RELIGIOUSAFFIL, is used to test whether this is associated with the provision of 
rural (and pro-poor) services as suggested by emerging research [12],[16].  
We estimate the equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) to provide benchmark 
results. Because reservation wages are reported in ranges rather than exact values, 
we also use interval regressions, which take censoring of the reported reservation 
wages into account. Because of the relatively small number of observations, the next 
section focuses on the results for nursing and medical students together (while 
including a dummy, DOCTOR, for medical students); all the main results are similar 
for the sub-sample of nursing students only, and the results for doctors are largely the 
same but less pronounced due to the small sample size. 
4. Results 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2 report the OLS results, and Columns 4, 5 and 6 the 
results from the interval regressions; both were run for the sample of 222 
observations. The results are consistent across specifications and estimation methods, 
and indicate that students with higher intrinsic motivation – those who rank ‘help the 
poor’ as the most important job characteristic – have lower rural reservation wages, 
with a coefficient statistically significant at the five percent level. Students who 10 
come from a richer background tend to have higher reservation wages, arguably 
because they can afford to be more selective about their work location, although the 
coefficient becomes insignificant in the second and third specifications (Columns 2, 
3, 5, and 6), when proxies for rural background and being born in an urban area are 
included. We do not find any evidence that students with a higher score on the 
medical knowledge test are less willing to work in rural areas. However, students 
who grew up in more remote areas, measured by the distance to school at age six, 
have lower reservation wages, in line with findings from previous studies [17]. In our 
sample, the only statistically significant religious affiliation is Adventist, and the 
estimations therefore focus on this particular affiliation. The results in Columns 2 
and 5 imply that students who are Adventist have lower rural reservation wages on 
average. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this reflects a local bonding scheme 
operated by Adventist communities in Rwanda, where a student has to repay funding 
either by working for the community, or in cash, and is encouraged to do her 
internship in a rural facility where she can later work. To unravel the effect of 
Adventist, we include an indicator variable for having rural work experience, 
RURWEXP, and an indicator variable reflecting whether the health worker has an 
obligation to pay back education expenses, OBLIGATION, and because not all 
Adventists necessarily participate in such a scheme, we include an interaction term 
between Adventist and these two variables, to reflect participation in the scheme. 
The inclusion of the interaction term renders the variable ADVENTIST insignificant 
(Columns 3 and 6), confirming that the latter reflected participation in the bonding 
scheme in the previous specification. While the local bonding scheme is known, it 11 
has so far only been documented with anecdotal evidence; our results suggest that it 
is effective in getting young health workers to take up rural posts. Finally, medical 
students have significantly higher reservation wages than nurses, as expected.  
The advantage of using an identical instrument to that in the Ethiopia survey is that 
the results can be compared. To save space we do not reproduce the regression 
results for Ethiopia, but refer instead to the original publication which reports a 
significant positive association between intrinsic motivation and willingness to work 
in a rural area, as in the Rwanda case [12]. Students from a richer background have 
higher reservation wages, and those who grew up in more remote areas and Catholic 
students have lower reservation wages. The latter is explained by the fact that most 
catholic students attended an NGO school that strongly encouraged commitment to 
rural service in its education.   
Because of the relatively low number of observations in each sample, we pool the 
observations for the two countries to estimate the coefficients more precisely. Table 
3 shows the results for Ethiopia and Rwanda with Columns 1 and 2 presenting the 
OLS results, and Columns 3 and 4 the findings from the interval estimation. Intrinsic 
motivation remains highly significant, at the one percent level, and is associated with 
lower reservation wages. The Adventist variable is also highly significant, reflecting 
the local bonding scheme operated in Rwanda as set out above. Catholic is weakly 
significant and reflects the catholic NGO in Ethiopia discussed earlier. The variable 
Protestant is also significant in the pooled data, while it was not in the separate 
samples, and further analysis is needed to understand what this effect is capturing. 
Rural background, as measured by the distance variable is no longer significant, but 12 
the variable ‘being born in Addis’ is significant in Column 2 , although not in 
Column 4. The reason is that the variables proxying for rural background are 
different in the two countries: distance to school in Rwanda and having an address in 
the capital in Ethiopia.  
The main results are very robust despite the notable differences between the two 
countries. Rwanda is a small country with high population density and a mixed 
public-private health system, Ethiopia a vast country with low population density, 
which has made the transition to a combined public-private health system recently. 
This suggests that health workers’ willingness to work in a rural area is not as 
context specific as is often assumed. 
5. Discussion
The results presented in this paper provide clear evidence of substantial 
heterogeneity in health workers’ willingness to work in a rural area. The analysis 
points to three factors in the Rwanda context: intrinsic motivation, rural background, 
and religious affiliation related to participation in a local bonding scheme. When 
supplementing the Rwanda data with similar data from Ethiopia, the results confirm 
two key determinants of rural reservation wages: motivation to help the poor and 
religious affiliation, where the latter reflects country specific activities by faith-based 
organizations: a local bonding scheme operated by the Adventist community in 
Rwanda, and training that encourages rural service by a Catholic NGO in Ethiopia. 
Among these results, the effect of motivation stands out as a particularly strong and 
robust finding. 13 
What does this imply for policy making? A first message is that, while economic 
incentives undoubtedly play an important role, they are not the only factor. In line 
with a growing theoretical literature on public service delivery [18], our results 
corroborate empirically that health worker motivation is also an important factor. 
Targeting of highly motivated health workers can therefore make schemes aimed at 
attracting and retaining staff in rural areas more effective. A simple simulation 
illustrates how it can also reduce costs. Assume for simplicity that we want 80 
percent of nurses in rural areas because approximately 80 percent of the population 
lives here. Paying the rural premium of 71 percent for starting nurses to all nurses 
would require a budget increase of 30 percent of the HR budget or 1.2 percent of the 
total annual health budget. If instead highly motivated health workers were targeted 
to have 50 percent motivated workers, the budget would only need to increase with 
22.5 percent of the HR budget or 0.9 percent of the total health budget. Although 
these are naïve simulations based on stringent assumptions, they illustrate the 
potential benefits of integrating motivation into human resource for health policies.  
Second, health workers with certain observable characteristics such as rural 
background tend to be more willing to work in a rural area and should therefore be 
actively encouraged to choose a rural posting, for instance through targeted 
recruitment programs like the ones discussed above.   
Third, the results on religious affiliation underline the important role of faith-based 
institutions in the health sector in Sub-Sahara Africa, and both the Rwanda and 
Ethiopia cases offer examples to inspire future policymaking.     14 
Of these three factors that affect health workers’ willingness to work in a rural area, 
rural background is the more tangible, while the role of intrinsic motivation, and the 
context specific role of faith-based institutions, deserve more attention in future 
analytical work.  15 
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Predicted parental household expenditure (US$ PPP)
Percentage score on medical knowledge test
Rural reservation wage (US$ PPP)
Dummy variable indicating opportunity to help the poor is 
most important job characteristic
Dummy variable indicating respondent is a medical 
student
Age of  respondent (years)
Dummy variable indicating respondent is female
Distance to school at age six (minutes)
Dummy variable indicating respondent is Adventist
Dummy variable indicating respondent is Catholic
Dummy variable indicating respondent is Protestant
Dummy variable indicating respondent born in Kigali
Dummy variable indicating respondent born in Addis
Dummy variable indicating respondent had rural work 
experience during training
Dummy variable indicating respondent has obligation to 
either work or repay funding received18 
Table 2. Ordinary least squares and interval estimation of rural reservation wages for Rwanda
*†‡ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HELPPOOR -0.230** -0.236** -0.240** -0.302** -0.309** -0.306**
(0.104) (0.101) (0.106) (0.141) (0.139) (0.140)
HHEXP 0.042* 0.020 0.023 0.049* 0.026 0.027
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.029)
TSCORE 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
AGE 0.007 0.006 0.010** 0.007 0.006 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FEMALE 0.001 -0.036 -0.050 -0.011 -0.055 -0.072
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052)
DISTANCE -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
KIGALI 0.027 0.027 0.000 0.004
(0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053)
ADVENTIST -0.228*** -0.094 -0.323*** -0.135







DOCTOR 0.281** 0.278** 0.211* 0.310** 0.310** 0.242*
(0.120) (0.113) (0.118) (0.145) (0.134) (0.138)
R-squared 0.586 0.615 0.645
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
‡ADV*RURWEXP*OBLIG indicates that a respondent has rural work experience, an obligation to work or repay funding 
received, and is Adventist.
Interval regressions
Nursing and medical students
OLS
†All regressions include a constant term and controls for year of study and for respondents with reservation wages greatest 
than the highest offer.
*The dependent variable is the natural log of the reported reservation wage.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
ADV*RURWEXP*OBLIG19 
Table 3. Ordinary least squares and interval estimation of rural reservation wages for Ethiopia 
and Rwanda
*† 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HELPPOOR -0.153*** -0.179*** -0.230*** -0.236***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.065) (0.067)
HHEXP 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TSCORE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
FEMALE 0.047 0.007 -0.017 -0.038
(0.033) (0.035) (0.047) (0.049)
AGE 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003













DOCTOR 0.694*** 0.640*** 0.710*** 0.662***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.041) (0.045)
R-squared 0.762 0.768
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nursing and medical students
OLS Interval regressions
*The dependent variable is the natural log of the reported reservation wage.
†All regressions include a constant term and a dummy variable for Ethiopia.20 
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